Wage comparisons in and out of the firm:Evidence from amatched employer–employee French database by Godechot, Olivier & Senik, Claudia
W
m
O
a
b
c
a
A
R
R
A
A
J
D
D
I
J
J
K
I
D
J
W
S
M
1
d
o
V
p
p
s
0Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 117 (2015) 395–410
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
journa l homepage: www.e lsev ier .com/ locate / jebo
age comparisons in and out of the ﬁrm. Evidence from a
atched employer–employee French database
livier Godechota,1, Claudia Senikb,c,∗
Sciences Po, MaxPo and OSC-CNRS, France
University Paris-Sorbonne, France
Paris School of Economics, France
r t i c l e i n f o
rticle history:
eceived 19 November 2014
eceived in revised form 28 April 2015
ccepted 5 July 2015
vailable online 13 July 2015
EL classiﬁcation:
31
63
30
28
31
eywords:
ncome comparisons
istribution
ob satisfaction
age satisfaction
ignal effect
atched employer–employee survey data
a b s t r a c t
This paper looks at the association betweenwage satisfaction and other people’s pay, based
on a matched employer–employee dataset. Three notions of reference wage appear to be
being of particular importance: (i) the median wage level in one’s ﬁrm, (ii) the level of
wage of similar workers in the region, and (iii) the top 1% wage in one’s ﬁrm. The ﬁrst
one triggers a signal effect, whereby all employees – especially young ones – whatever
their relative position in the ﬁrm, are happier the higher the median wage in their ﬁrm,
holding their own wage constant. The second and the third ones are sources of relative
deprivation, i.e. workers’ satisfaction decreases with the gap between their own salary and
these reference categories. These ﬁndings are based on objective measures of earnings as
well as subjective declarations about wage satisfaction, awareness of other people’s pay
and reported income comparisons.
. Introduction
Howdoworkers’ engagement and job satisfaction depend on the patterns of thewage distributionwithin their ﬁrm?How
oes it feel to live in a place where the majority of your neighbors are wealthier than you are? The enquiry about feelings
f relative deprivation due to income gaps can be traced back a long way, at least as far as Adam Smith (1759), and, later,
eblen (1899), Duesenberry (1949), Stouffer et al. (1949) and Runciman (1966). More recently, social scientists have tried to
rovide statistical evidence of this phenomenon, coined under the term of non-market social interactions. This appellation
oints to the fact that people’s income may affect each other’s wellbeing, not because of market-type interdependence,
uch as price eviction, playing through supply and demand effects (“constraint interactions”), but because of “preference
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interactions”, “preference interdependence” or “observational learning [that generates] expectations interactions” (Manski
and Straub, 2000). In the realm of the ﬁrm, the fact that employees care about the wage of their co-workers, and not only
about the level of their own pay, can be viewed as a form of procedural utility, i.e. deriving not only from “what” people do
during their working time but also from “how” they do it (Frey and Stutzer, 2005).
But how can one provide evidence of the hypothesized impact of income gaps? Since the mid-1990s, after the breach
opened by the seminal paper by Clark and Oswald (1996), one route that researchers have explored is the recourse to
subjective data. To date, a sizeable quantity of studies in the impact of relative income concerns on subjective happiness,
life satisfaction, ﬁnancial satisfaction and job satisfaction, has been accumulated (see the surveys by Clark et al. (2008) or
Clark and D’Ambrosio (2014)). However, most of that empirical literature, based on subjective wellbeing statements, has
relied on representative surveys of the general population, rather than on workplace surveys, for reasons of data availability.
We have thus learned more about income comparisons between groups of the general population than about within-ﬁrms
wage comparisons. This is, of course, regrettable, as income interactions on the job are likely to be of primary importance. In
particular, if workers’ motivation depends on their relativewage, taking care of distributional concerns should be an integral
part of human resources management inside ﬁrms, as well as labor market policy. For instance, an important theoretical
literature in personnel economics has analyzed the implications of other-regarding preferences on the optimal type of
contract offered by ﬁrms to their employees. This literature stresses the particular importance of “behindness aversion”
and its potential impact on wage compression within ﬁrms (Neilson and Stowe, 2010). One of the main questions of this
literature is about the desirability of incentive pay, in particular piece-rate compensation versus ﬂat-wage contracts, when
agents are sensitive to relative wage concerns (Bartling, 2012), but more generally, it illustrates the importance of within-
ﬁrm wage distribution. This paper contributes to this enquiry by providing empirical evidence on the relationship between
wage satisfaction andwage gapswithin andbetweenﬁrms, therefore shedding light on the speciﬁc nature of other-regarding
preferences on the labor market.
Essentially, the literature has uncovered two different channels through which income gaps might impact subjective
wellbeing: a pure preference for other people’s pay or an indirect signal effect. This distinction has now been popularized as
“status versus signal” or “jealousy versus ambition”. The latter may take place when a person shares some common features
with her reference group, such as similar productive skills, or some relations of interdependence,which creates the prospects
of common future outcomes. The objective of this paper is to ask, empirically,whichnotions of incomegaps aremost strongly
related to individual wage satisfaction, and what the nature of these relations is.
We take advantage of an exhaustive employer–employee database, obtained by matching a French survey of wage
earners (SalSa, 2009) with a ﬁle of the social insurance organization (DADS-2008) that contains information about the
worked hours and wages for all of the employees of the private sector, as well as local administration and hospital civil
servants, as declared by their employer. For each surveyed individual, SalSa elicited a series of opinions and satisfaction
statements, notably wage satisfaction as well as the direction and intensity of income comparisons. Using the DADS-2008
ﬁle, we construct, for each individual surveyed in SalSa, a number of objective measures that are candidates to act as
reference wage benchmarks. We then explore the association between wage satisfaction and these notions of reference
wage.
In summary,we take seriously the idea that people are not only interested in their own leisure and consumption (income),
but also in other people’s pay. If income utility is relative, we want to know what notion of relative income employees
maximize. We take an agnostic view and test for the existence of all the aforementioned wage-based social interactions.
We uncover important signal effects within ﬁrms. Employees’ wage satisfaction increases with the median level of
wage in their ﬁrm, and with the pay level of the top quartile. These signal effects are stronger for younger people below
35. But we also ﬁnd empirical support for relative status effects. Employees’ wage satisfaction decreases when the wage
of the top 1% best paid employees in the ﬁrm rises. Their satisfaction rises with their rank in the wage distribution of
their ﬁrm. Employees are concerned by their relative wage as compared to their coworkers in the same broad category
of occupation, in the same age group, in the same region, but in other ﬁrms. Both relative income concerns and sig-
nal effects are compounded by employees’ knowledge about other people’s pay and the importance that they attach to
comparisons.
The next section reviews the literature on income-based social interactions. Section 3 presents the data, Section 4 the
identiﬁcation strategy, Section 5 the results, and Section 6 concludes.
2. Literature
Because attitudes to income gaps are non-market social interactions, researchers cannot follow the classic revealed-
preference method to elicit them. Instead, social scientists have used subjective statements of satisfaction, collected in large
surveys, in order to explore the relation between satisfaction and different moments of income distribution. The recourse to
self-declared satisfaction, happiness and wellbeing has diffused across the social sciences for the last 20 years. The reliability
and predictive power of such subjective data has been the object of many validation tests, as recalled, inter alia, by Clark
et al. (2008).
The general method, based on these data, consists in estimating an individual satisfaction function Ui on a set of socio-
demographic control variables (Ci), including individual income yi plus a measure of the social magnitude of interest (yi)*.
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large part of the literature has tried to test the existence and importance of relative income concerns, by assuming that
eople compare to somerelevantothers, a referencegroup,whose incomeplays the roleof reference income, i.e. a benchmark
sed to gauge their own living standard.Wehere consider awage satisfaction function. Assuming convexity and separability,
nd keeping leisure time constant, the latter can be written as:
Ui = ˛0 · ln(yi) + ˛1 · ln(yi∗) + v · Ci + εi (1)
here Ui is the level of wage satisfaction of individual i, yi is her income, Ci is a vector of individual controls (age, gender,
ccupation, region, tenure, log of ﬁrm size, nationality.), ln(yi*) is the aforementioned indicator of (the natural logarithm
f) reference wage and is indexed by i when it varies across individuals, and εi is the error term. Of course, our inter-
st here is with the conditional correlation between wage satisfaction and reference wage, as measured by parameter
1.
In the absence of relative income concerns, we expect 1 to be zero, i.e. once the employee’s own wage is taken into
ccount, other people’s pay does not matter. Relative income concerns, on the other hand, imply that ˛1 is negative.
inally, as suggested by Hirschman and Rothschild (1973), other people’s wage may not act as a benchmark, but rather
s a source of information about one’s future prospects. The usual rationale of Hirschman type signal effects is that in
ituations of uncertainty and lack of information, such as exempliﬁed by his famous tunnel parable, a person bases her
xpectations on the observation of other people’s fortune. In the realm of the ﬁrm, the mechanism may be a slightly dif-
erent, as the career of all workers depends jointly on the ﬁrm’s outlook. According to this signal effect, we expect ˇ1 to be
ositive.
This literature has appealed to different datasets (in terms of countries and years), different measures of wellbeing (job
nd life satisfaction being the most predominant) and various measures of comparison income. In terms of reference groups,
esearchers have mainly investigated the relevance of professional groups, co-citizens and neighbors. To do so, they have
ypically constructed different measures of what they thought could be the typical income of one’s reference group (yi*),
nd tested for their relevance. Most of these studies found evidence of relative income concerns, i.e. a negative association
etween satisfaction and reference income (see Clark and D’Ambrosio, 2014, for a survey).
Some authors have included direct subjective comparison questions in surveys that were run in the Netherlands
Melenberg, 1992), in the USA (McBride, 2001), in transition countries (Senik, 2009), in Europe (Clark and Senik, 2010),
n Germany (Mayraz et al., 2010), and in China (Knight and Gunatilaka, 2011; Knight and Song, 2006). It generally appears
hat subjectively elicited comparisons work in the sense of relative income concerns rather than signal effect.
One of the ﬁndings of this literature is the difference between within-ﬁrm and outside-ﬁrm benchmarks (Cappelli
nd Sherer, 1988; Bygren, 2004). In his path-breaking work, Runciman (1966) had already underlined the importance of
istinguishing relative deprivation within one’s group, versus on behalf of one’s group.
In spite of the evidence about “others as negatives” (Luttmer, 2005), some researchers have documented the existence
f signal effects, in Transition countries (Senik, 2004, 2008), in Denmark (Clark et al., 2009) and in Europe in general (Clark
nd Senik, 2010). Studies that uncovered signal effects also found that the latter are particularly strong for young people.
bviously, the professional future of the young is both more uncertain and longer, and young people in their early career
ay have more reasons to expect a promotion than senior employees: for these reasons, the signal is likely to be of higher
alue to their eyes. Accordingly, other papers have underlined the life cycle variation in the intensity of status and signal
ffects (FitzRoy et al., 2011; Akay and Martinsson, 2012).
Beyond the impact of relative income, a few studies have shown evidence that self-reported wellbeing depends upon
he objective ordinal rank of an individual’s wage within a comparison group, such as her ﬁrm (e.g. Brown et al., 2008;
afchamps and Shilpi, 2008; Clark and Senik, 2014). The difference between rank concerns and relative income concerns is
hat the former is a comparison with the entire distribution of wages in one’s ﬁrm. It is likely that the rank occupied by an
ndividual is associated with a symbolic value, and possibly power and prestige.
In surveys, however, the information on the actual social environment of individuals ismost often unavailable so that it is
ifﬁcult to measure the income of a person’s actual coworkers or neighbors. This is most unfortunate, as social interactions
re likely to be predominantly local. Clark et al. (2009) is one of the rare exceptions, as they were able to merge the Danish
ample of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) with administrative records. The British Workplace Employee
elations Survey is also a matched employer–employee dataset, but it is not exhaustive (see Brown et al., 2008). Another
xample is Brodeur and Flèche (2013). A recent randomized experiment was set up by Card et al. (2012), showing evidence
f relative concerns among employees of the public universities of California when they had access to Internet information
bout the wage of their colleagues in the same department.
This paper is thus one of the ﬁrst attempts to match a survey of employees that includes a great number of subjective
ther-regarding attitudeswith an exhaustive administrative database about employees of all private ﬁrms and organizations
n the country. We take advantage of this information to test for the relevance and importance of all of the different effects
ypothesized by the literature, i.e. status, signal and rank effects.We comparewithin ﬁrmand out-of-the-ﬁrm income-based
ocial interactions. We are particularly interested in eliciting the context in which signal effects overweight status effects,
s the former contribute to wellbeing and satisfaction, whereas the latter is a destructor of these values.
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3. Data
We  match two French datasets. The ﬁrst one comes from a survey that was run in 2009 among 3000 employees in
France, with a special interest in the way they perceive their wage (SalSa, Les salaires vus par les salariés). The second one is
extracted from the DADS-2008 administrative ﬁle, devoted to the calculation of social contributions. A detailed description
of the surveys is provided at the beginning of Appendix. In particular, we  show that SalSa is a representative sample of the
employees in France, in terms of occupations and wages (Table A1).
We  matched each individual surveyed in SalSa with his own  records in the DADS as of 2008, as well as with the records
of all his coworkers, i.e. employees working in the same establishment or ﬁrm, which makes a sample of 33,149,444 jobs.
We use this large dataset to calculate the relevant income distribution and reference wage indicators for each employee
of SalSa. Our regression sample (non missing observations) includes 2842 individuals surveyed by SalSa, aged 19–65 and
equally balanced in terms of gender, as described in Table A2 in Appendix.
We use the wage levels declared by employers in the DADS rather than self-declared wages, as the latter are likely to be
fraught with greater measurement errors.
The SalSa survey includes subjective questions that ask employees whether they are aware about the wage of their
colleagues, managers and top-management (CEOs), whether they actually compare their own wage to that of coworkers,
friends or family members, whether they consider quitting their current job, etc. We  use the questions that are listed in
Tables A3 and A4 in Appendix.
Table A3 shows that about half of the respondents are satisﬁed with their wage; only 37% are rather unsatisﬁed and 9.5%
are very unsatisﬁed. However, 19% estimate that their wage is insufﬁcient to make ends meet; 58% that their wage is low
given their productivity; 61% that it is low given their experience; 33% that it is low given their education. Only 3.2% of
employees say they do not like their job. 16.5% consider quitting their job, and half of the latter would do so for a higher
wage. Only 45% of employees have already asked for a wage rise. 22% have participated in a collective action on the job place.
Turning to wage comparisons, 66% of respondents declare that they know the wage of some of their colleagues; 30% know
the wage of their direct manager; 19% know the wage of their boss (CEO); 41% are aware of the wage of people working in
the same profession in other ﬁrms; 50% declare that they do compare their wage to that of their colleagues in the same ﬁrm;
48% that they compare their wage to family members; 21% to former schoolmates; 44% to friends, and 41% to the minimum
wage level (SMIC).
4. Speciﬁcation
Matching SalSa with the DADS creates the opportunity to study wage-based social interactions, using information about
workers’ actual social environment. We  consider different possible notions of reference wage: the average and median wage
within one’s ﬁrm and within one’s establishment, as well as the top wage quartile (Q3) and the top centile (P99) within one’s
ﬁrm, or establishment. We  also calculate the typical hourly wage rate of “people like me  outside ﬁrm”, as the median wage
of all employees in the French private sector who belong in the same age category (18–35, 36–45, 46–55, 56–65), work in the
same region (French département),  in the same occupation (4 categories: blue collars, clerks, intermediate and managers)
but in other ﬁrms. We  ask whether and how these benchmarks affect wage satisfaction.
In order to conﬁrm the relevance of these constructed notions of reference wage, we use the subjective declarations of
respondents in the survey. We  interact the aforementioned categories of reference wage with the intensity of knowledge of
other people’s income or the importance of comparisons, as declared by respondents. Hence, using each of the subjective
questions presented in Section 2, we estimate the wage satisfaction equation (1), in which we include an interaction term
between the notion of reference wage and the subjective attitude X. In Eq. (2), for instance, we expect that the correlation
between reference wage and wage satisfaction be reinforced when respondents are aware and interested in the wage of
other people, i.e. that the coefﬁcient on the interaction term 4 be statistically signiﬁcant:
Ui = ˛0 · ln(yi) + ˛1 · ln(yi∗) + ˛2Xi + ˛3 · ln(yi) × Xi + ˛4 · ln(yi∗) × Xi + v · Ci + εi (2)
We  also look at the heterogeneity of the relation between reference wage and wage satisfaction across demographic groups.
In particular, it is likely that wage interactions are more of a signal type for young people, and more of a status type for
elder workers. In order to test for this hypothesis, we introduce interaction terms involving demographic categories and
measures of income distribution (median wage and reference wage), following the speciﬁcation of Eq. (2). Note that we  also
interact individuals’ own wage with Xi, in order to allow for the potential heterogeneity of the relationship between wage
and satisfaction.
We  run OLS estimates of wage satisfaction and other subjective attitudes, the result of which are readily interpretable in
terms of elasticity. We  refer, classically, to Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Fritjers (2004) for a justiﬁcation of this linear approxima-
tion. For robustness, we  ran equivalent estimates using an ordered probit model; the magnitude and sign of the coefﬁcients
were similar in both speciﬁcations. In the tables, we present regression coefﬁcients and their standard errors in parentheses
below, as well as the standardized coefﬁcients (where all of the variables are divided by their standard deviation) beneath
into square brackets.
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. Results
All of the estimates include the same basic controls, as displayed in Table A5 in the Appendix, i.e. gender, nationality,
ducation dummies, a dummy  for working in the hospital or local public sector (as opposed to the private sector), age, age
quared, tenure, tenure squared, ln (ﬁrm size) and ln (hourly wage rate).
.1. Within-ﬁrm signal and status effects
We  start with the estimation of Eq. (1) including different notions of within-ﬁrm reference wage.
.1.1. My  coworkers are rich
Table 1 shows that most of within-ﬁrm concepts of reference wage are positively associated with wage satisfaction. Given
er own wage, an employee is more satisﬁed with her pay the higher the level of the median wage in her ﬁrm (legal deﬁnition)
nd in her establishment (as deﬁned by the address of the place where a worker is employed), as shown by rows (2) and (3).
dentically, she is more satisﬁed the higher the income level of the top quartile (Q3) in her ﬁrm, or establishment (rows 4 and
). The order of magnitude of these effect is given by the standardized coefﬁcients into square brackets. When a ﬁrm’s median
age rise by one standard deviation, wage satisfaction rises approximately by 6 percentage points of a standard deviation.
able 1
lternative notions of reference wage. OLS estimates of wage satisfaction.
Wage satisfaction
Reference wage: ln(y*), where y* is: ↓ Coef. ˇ1 (s.e.) Adj. R2
1 Firm average wage 0.046 (0.050)
[0.019]
10.82
2  Firm median wage 0.178** (0.061)
[0.063]
11.03
3  Establishment median wage 0.176** (0.061)
[0.064]
11.04
4  Q3 wage inside the ﬁrm 0.112* (0.050)
[0.049]
10.95
5  Q3 wage inside the establishment 0.111* (0.050)
[0.050]
10.95
6  P99 in the ﬁrm −0.046* (0.027)
[−0.037]
10.89
7 Rank in the ﬁrm 0.078 (0.064)
[0.029]
10.85
8  Median wage of outside ﬁrm similar othersa −0.142* (0.069)
[−0.060]
10.93
9  Average wage of outside ﬁrm similar others −0.131* (0.067)
[−0.057]
10.91
10 Median wage of within ﬁrm similar others 0.087 (0.075)
[0.045]
10.84
11  Average wage of within ﬁrm similar others 0.049 (0.070)
[0.025]
10.81
ote: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
he third ﬁgure displayed into brackets is the standardized coefﬁcient; it results from the division of all variables by their standard deviation. For instance,
n  row 1, it reads in the following way: a variation of the log ﬁrm average wage by one standard deviation is associated with an increase in wage satisfaction
y  0.019 standard deviation.
ach line corresponds to a separate regression.
a Similar others are coworkers working in the same region (French département), in the same occupation (4 categories: blue collars, clerks, intermediate
nd  managers), in the same age category (deﬁned as such: 18–35, 36–45, 46–55, 56–65).
ther controls (as in Table A5): gender, nationality, age, age-squared, education, tenure, tenure squared, public/private sector, log of ﬁrm size, log of hourly
age  rate as declared by employer in DADS.
umber of observations: 2842.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.01.
**p < 0.001.
This positive association does not depend on whether one’s wage is below or above the median wage in one’s ﬁrm. To
e more precise, Table 2 shows that it holds independently of the position of a worker in the ﬁrm’s wage-grid, i.e. whether
t belongs to the ﬁrst, second, third or fourth quartile in the wage distribution; moreover, none of the interaction terms
etween the two variables is statistically signiﬁcant (rows 5–7)..1.2. Top wages within my  ﬁrm
As shown by row 6 in Table 1, there is a limit to the positive effect of other co-workers’ wage: the satisfaction of employees
s negatively associated with the wage level of the 1% best paid coworkers in their ﬁrm. This talks to the attention that “top
ncomes” have attracted over the last years, and in particular the top 1% richest households within a society (Atkinson and
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Table 2
Wage satisfaction and the median wage level depending on the position of the respondent inside the ﬁrm. OLS estimates of wage satisfaction.
Wage satisfaction
1 Median wage level inside the ﬁrm (log) 0.231** (0.088)
2  Respondent belongs to Q1 (log) −0.388 (0.350)
3  Respondent belongs to Q2 (log) −0.534* (0.277)
4  Respondent belongs to Q3 (log) −0.345 (0.272)
5  Respondent belongs to Q1 × Median (log) 0.105 (0.146)
6  Respondent belongs to Q2 × Median (log) 0.163 (0.115)
7  Respondent belongs to Q3 × Median (log) 0.132 (0.112)
Adj.  R2 11.54
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Other controls: all controls of Table A5.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.01.
***p < 0.001.
Piketty, 2010). This thin elite was also a target of the 2011 Occupy social movement that claimed to speak in the name of the
99% (“We are the 99%!”) against the top 1% (Calhoun, 2013).
Within one’s ﬁrm, is it really the top 1% wage that matters? To address this question, Table 3 displays “reversal thresholds”.
Each cell represents a separate estimate of wage satisfaction that includes the usual controls. The ﬁrst cell presents the
coefﬁcient on the lowest wage in the ﬁrm, which turns out not to be statistically signiﬁcant. The second cell displays the
coefﬁcient on the lowest 10% wages in the ﬁrm, etc. It is only starting with the lowest quartile (P25) and until the level
of the highest quartile (P75) that the coefﬁcients are statistically signiﬁcantly positive. Then, the association between the
level of the top wages and employees’ satisfaction turns negative starting beyond the level of the top 5% (P95) and becomes
statistically signiﬁcantly so with the top 1% (P99).
5.1.3. My  rank in my ﬁrm
Row 7 in Table 1 displays the association between an employee’s rank in her ﬁrm’s wage distribution and her wage
satisfaction. This measure is calculated for each employee within her ﬁrm, and transformed hereafter into percentiles.
The coefﬁcient is not statistically signiﬁcant, but this could be due to the interplay between absolute and relative wage
concerns: being amongst the top best-paid employees of a low-wage ﬁrm may  be a source of enjoyable status effect, but in
terms of purchasing power and career prospects, it may  be preferable to earn the average wage in a high-wage ﬁrm. De facto,
once the median level of wage is introduced in the estimate, people’s rank is positively associated with wage satisfaction
(0.335***[0.082], see also Table 4).
Table 3
Reversal threshold. OLS estimates of wage satisfaction over alternative measures of wage distribution inside each ﬁrm.
Wage satisfaction
Smallest wage in the ﬁrm (log) −0.006
(0.010)
P1  in the ﬁrm (log) 0.002
(0.019)
P5  in the ﬁrm (log) 0.023
(0.024)
P10 in the ﬁrm (log) 0.023
(0.037)
P25 in the ﬁrm (log) 0.176**
(0.067)
P50 in the ﬁrm (log) 0.178**
(0.061)
P75 in the ﬁrm (log) 0.113*
(0.049)
P90 in the ﬁrm (log) 0.032
(0.039)
P95 in the ﬁrm (log) 0.006
(0.034)
P99 in the ﬁrm (log) −0.046*
(0.027)
Highest wage in the ﬁrm (log) −0.015
(0.015)
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Each cell corresponds to a separate regression of wage satisfaction over the indicated measure.
Other controls: all controls of Table A5.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.01.
***p < 0.001.
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.1.4. People like me in other ﬁrms
Rows 8 and 9 in Table 1 display the coefﬁcient on the wage of similar workers of the same age category, employed in the
ame occupation, in the same region, but in other ﬁrms. It is calculated on the entire population of the DADS. The coefﬁcients
re negative and statistically signiﬁcant (at the 10% level). We  have tested, but failed to detect a (statistically signiﬁcant)
symmetry in this relationship, depending on whether a person stands above or below this notion of regional reference
age.
.1.5. People like me in my  own ﬁrm
Finally, the two last rows at the bottom of Table 1 show that the median or average wage of other people sharing the
ame productive characteristics (occupation, age category) within one’s ﬁrm is not statistically signiﬁcantly correlated with
age satisfaction.
.1.6. Interpretation and robustness: status and signal effects
We interpret the different effects displayed in Table 1 as evidence that both signal and status concerns are at play inside
he ﬁrm.
Firstly, the positive association between a person’s wage satisfaction and the level of wages within her ﬁrm (from P25
o P75) is likely to reﬂect a signal effect, whereby a high level of wages is interpreted as a positive outlook for the ﬁrm and
ood career prospects within that ﬁrm, hence positive expectations about the evolution of one’s own  pay.
Secondly, Table 1 also offers evidence of relative wage concerns. The positive coefﬁcient on one’s wage rank is a sign
f status concern. The same is true of the negative coefﬁcient on the top 1% level of wage within one’s ﬁrm. The fact
hat the typical level of wage of “people like me  employed in other ﬁrms” attracts a negative coefﬁcient conﬁrms the
ifference between within-ﬁrm and between-ﬁrms wage comparisons. It suggests that as far as employees in other ﬁrms
re concerned, relative income concerns are stronger than signal effects. Finally, the wage of similar co-workers in the same
rm as a person is uncorrelated with her wage satisfaction, which probably reﬂects the opposing impact of status and signal
ffects.
Table 4 summarizes all of these effects: it displays the result of an estimate that includes all of these potential wage
enchmarks. Workers’ satisfaction raises with the median wage level within their ﬁrm and with their own rank in the wage
istribution within their ﬁrm, but decreases with the top 1% wage level within their ﬁrm, as well as with the wage of other
imilar workers in the region. Admittedly, the size of the coefﬁcient on the top P99 wage is very small, as compared to that
f the median wage: it is smaller by about one sixth. On the job place, the information effect of higher wages seems to be
ore powerful than the desire for wage equality.
The following robustness checks strengthen this interpretation.
Table 4
A synthetic view of within-ﬁrm wage-based social interactions. OLS estimates of wage satisfaction.
Wage satisfaction
1 Median wage level (log) 0.446*** (0.087)
[0.156]
2  P99 wage level (log) −0.074* (0.032)
[−0.060]
3  Regional reference wage −0.124* (0.068)
[−0.053]
4  Rank in the ﬁrm 0.268** (0.091)
[0.101]
N  2842
Adj. R2 11.73
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Standardized coefﬁcients in square brackets.
Other controls: all controls of Table A5.
Row 1: median level of wage in the ﬁrm.
Row 2: upper bound of the 99th wage centile in the ﬁrm.
Row 3: average wage of employees in other ﬁrms in the same region, occupation, age category.
Row 4: rank of the employee in her ﬁrm, transformed into percentiles.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.01.
*** p < 0.001.
.1.7. A stronger signal effect for young workers
Consistently with the interpretation in terms of signal, Table 5 shows that the positive effect of the median wage within
ne’s ﬁrm is stronger for younger workers, under 35. This classical ﬁnding (see Senik, 2004, 2008; Akay and Martinsson,
012) is certainly due to the longer career that lies ahead of them, as well as to the greater uncertainty of their future
rospects.
402 O. Godechot, C. Senik / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 117 (2015) 395–410
Table 5
Heterogeneity. OLS estimates of wage satisfaction.
Main effect y* = median
wage in i’s ﬁrm
y* = P99
(median controlled)
y* = estimated regional reference wage
(median controlled)
1 ln(yi) 0.665***
(0.047)
0.614***
(0.056)
0.593***
(0.054)
0.669***
(0.074)
2  ln(y*) 0.105
(0.071)
−0.102**
(0.037)
−0.162*
(0.076)
3  Age <35 −0.038
(0.058)
−0.668*
(0.306)
−0.267
(0.267)
−0.425
(0.331)
4  ln(yi) × age <35 0.001
(0.111)
0.094
(0.102)
0.020
(0.126)
5  ln(y*) × age<35 0.263*
(0.134)
0.000
(0.052)
0.139
(0.175)
Adj  R2 10.81 11.10 11.32 11.10
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
One regression per column.
Other controls: all controls of Table A5.
Respondents under 35 years old represent 30.3% of the sample.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.01.
*** p < 0.001.
5.1.8. Other measures of wage satisfaction
Table 6 presents estimates of alternative measures of satisfaction. Each column corresponds to a separate regression.
(The ﬁrst column is similar to that of Table 4). The second column presents the estimate of the self-declared “level of wage
that would be normal for this type of job”; column 3 displays the degree to which respondents agrees that “my ﬁrm pays better
than other ﬁrms”, etc. The ﬁrst row displays the coefﬁcient on the median level of wage in the ﬁrm; the second row shows
the coefﬁcient on the top 1% wage, the third row the coefﬁcient on the regional reference wage, and the last one the wage
rank in the ﬁrm. The three measures are included in each regression.
Column 2 in Table 6 shows that, controlling for the actual wage of an employee, the higher the level of her ﬁrm’s median
wage, the lower the level of wage that he deems “normal”, i.e. the lower the additional wage that he aspires to. Conversely,
the higher the reference wage of a respondent, or the level of pay of the top 1% best-paid employees in the ﬁrm, the higher
the wage he aspires to. This is consistent with the relative deprivation effects mentioned above.
Column 3 displays estimates of explicit inter-ﬁrm wage comparisons. As expected, the higher the level of the median
wage in one’s ﬁrm, the more likely a person is to declare that “her ﬁrm pays better than other ﬁrms”. Logically, the opposite
holds for the level of wages found in other ﬁrms, in the same region, for the same occupation category.
In the same spirit, employees who work in ﬁrms with high median wages are less subject to “exit” intentions (Hirschman,
1970; Godechot and Salibekyan, 2013). They are less likely to consider quitting their job (column 4), in order to ﬁnd a better
paid job (column 5) or to ask for a pay rise (column 6).
Columns 7–9 display the estimate of other measures of wage satisfaction, which exhibit the same patterns (“my wage
corresponds to my  productivity”; “. . . to my experience”; “. . .to my diploma”).
Finally columns 10 and 11 play the role of placebo regressions in the sense that there is no reason to expect that either
of the three reference categories (median wage, reference wage and top 1% wage) should be correlated with attitudes such
as “I like what I do during my work”, or “my wage is enough to cover my needs”,  as the latter, in principle, do not capture any
sense of wage comparison in the ﬁrm. De facto, no statistically signiﬁcant relationship was found in these estimates. If the
association between other people’s wage and individual satisfaction were due to some unobserved omitted variable that
would jointly inﬂuence them, the latter would also inﬂuence other dimensions of job satisfaction – which obviously is not
the case.
5.1.9. Interactions between constructed reference wage and knowledge of other people’s pay
If the results displayed so far are to be interpreted as revealing some underlying social interactions, then the various
benchmark wages considered so far should be all the more strongly associated with wage satisfaction as employees are
aware of the income of their peers and attach importance to comparisons. To enquire, we interact reference wage variables
with subjective perceptions of other people’s wage.
Table 7 displays the results of these tests. Each panel corresponds to a separate regression of wage satisfaction, controlling
for within-ﬁrm median wage and the other usual controls. Column 1 presents the main effects. It shows that wage satisfaction
is lower for people who are aware about the wage of their co-workers and do compare with it, but not for those who know
the wage of their top-manager or workers in the same profession in other ﬁrms, where the coefﬁcients are not statistically
signiﬁcant.
Column 2 of Table 7 presents the interactions of subjective comparisons (in rows) with the median wage level in one’s
ﬁrm. The positive effect of the median wage is enhanced for those who know and do compare to the wage of their co-workers
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Table 6
OLS estimates of other work attitudes.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Wage
satisfaction
Level  of
wage
considered
“normal”
for this
type of job
My ﬁrm
pays better
than other
ﬁrms
I  consider
quitting my
ﬁrm
I  want to
quit for a
better
wage
Asked
supervisor
for a pay
rise
My  wage
corre-
sponds to
my produc-
tivity
My wage
corre-
sponds to
my
experience
My  wage
corre-
sponds to
my
diploma
I  like what I
do  during
my work
My wage is
sufﬁcient
to cover my
needs
Median wage 0.446***
(0.087)
[0.156]
−0.047
(0.054)
[−0.024]
0.207***
(0.060)
[0.176]
−0.056
(0.050)
[−0.038]
−0.045
(0.031)
[−0.041]
−0.007
(0.06)
[−0.004]
0.138*
(0.073)
[0.060]
0.124*
(0.071)
[0.059]
0.244**
(0.079)
[0.097]
0.007
(0.085)
[0.002]
−0.002
(0.105)
[−0.001]
P99  wage −0.074*
(0.032)
[−0.060]
0.073***
(0.015)
[0.088]
−0.060***
(0.022)
[−0.080]
0.013
(0.018)
[0.021]
0.027*
(0.015)
[0.057]
0.046*
(0.022)
[0.054]
−0.024
(0.026)
[−0.025]
−0.015
(0.024)
[−0.017]
−0.012
(0.029)
[−0.011]
0.009
(0.031)
[0.007]
0.058
(0.038)
[0.037]
Regional reference wage −0.124*
(0.068)
[−0.053]
0.181***
(0.042)
[0.114]
−0.109*
(0.047)
[−0.077]
0.108**
(0.036)
[0.089]
0.027
(0.025)
[0.030]
0.044
(0.049)
[0.027]
0.030
(0.060)
[0.016]
0.035
(0.054)
[0.020]
0.151*
(0.064)
[0.073]
0.118
(0.072)
[0.048]
0.012
(0.082)
[0.004]
Rank  in the ﬁrm 0.268**
(0.091)
[0.101]
0.018
(0.052)
[0.010]
0.081
(0.059)
[0.051]
0.007
(0.048)
[0.005]
0.041
(0.036)
[0.040]
0.040
(0.062)
[0.022]
−0.010
(0.072)
[−0.005]
0.035
(0.064)
[0.018]
0.140*
(0.079)
[0.060]
0.093
(0.091)
[0.033]
0.170
(0.107)
[0.051]
N  2842 2638 2580 2781 2760 2802 2733 2777 2586 2839 2815
Adj.  R2 11.73 55.39 7.17 4.32 3.69 5.29 3.49 10.39 20.06 3.28 20.84
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standardized coefﬁcients in square brackets.
One regression per column. Other controls: all controls of Table A5.
All  dependent variables (except column 2) are reordered in the direction of increasing agreement with the mentioned statement.
The  number of observations varies slightly due to different non-response to subjective satisfaction questions.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.01.
*** p < 0.001.
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Table 7
Interactions between reference wage and subjective comparisons. OLS estimates of wage satisfaction.
Main effect y* = within-ﬁrm
median wage
y* = P99 (median
controlled)
y* = regional reference
wage (median
controlled)
1
ln(yi) 0.665*** (0.047) 0.611*** (0.063) 0.576*** (0.060) 0.570*** (0.080)
ln(y*) 0.078 (0.077) −0.093* (0.037) −0.038 (0.085)
Knows and compares to the wage of co-workers −0.147***
(0.026)
−0.768** (0.238) −0.336* (0.199) −0.140 (0.189)
ln(yi) × Knows and compares to the wage of
co-workers
−0.009 (0.082) 0.082 (0.072) 0.252* (0.107)
ln(y*)  × Knows and compares to the wage of
co-workers
0.273* (0.121) −0.003 (0.051) −0.264* (0.124)
Adj  R2 11.76 12.11 12.25 12.21
2
ln(yi) 0.663*** (0.047) 0.603*** (0.061) 0.613*** (0.060) 0.697*** (0.077)
ln(y*)  0.245*** (0.071) −0.067* (0.033) −0.136* (0.079)
Knows approximately the wage of ﬁrm’s
top-managers
0.040 (0.032) 0.789** (0.271) 0.644** (0.217) 0.305 (0.218)
ln(yi) × knows approximately the wage of ﬁrm’s
top-managers
−0.005 (0.085) 0.014 (0.076) −0.107 (0.113)
ln(y*)  × knows approximately the wage of ﬁrm’s
top-managers
−0.309* (0.135) −0.191** (0.058) 0.002 (0.138)
Adj  R2 10.84 11.19 11.67 11.14
3
ln(yi) 0.667*** (0.047) 0.551*** (0.062) 0.533*** (0.059) 0.480*** (0.078)
ln(y*)  0.083 (0.076) −0.116*** (0.034) 0.018 (0.087)
Compares to other ﬁrms −0.015 (0.027) −0.914*** (0.241) −0.643** (0.198) −0.254 (0.193)
ln(yi) × compares to other ﬁrms 0.146* (0.083) 0.202**
(0.073)
0.470*** (0.107)
ln(y*)  × compares to other ﬁrms 0.229* (0.122) 0.038 (0.051) −0.386** (0.124)
Adj.  R2 10.81 11.43 11.66 11.73
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
One regression per column and by panel.
Other controls: all controls of Table A5.
Panel 1: “Knows and compares to the wage of co-workers”: this binary (0/1) variable was constructed as the interaction between the fact that a respondent
knows  the wage of some of her colleagues (66.1% of respondents) and the fact that she does compare with the wages of her colleagues (49.6% of respondents).
It  is equal to 1 in 41.3% of the cases.
Panel 3: “Compares to other ﬁrms”: this variable was  constructed as equal to 1 if the respondent indicated that her ﬁrm pays either better (19.1% of
respondents) or worse (23.4% of respondents) than other ﬁrms in the same branch and 0 if she chose “similarly” or “don’t know”. It is equal to 1 in 42.5%
of  the cases.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.01.
*** p < 0.001.
(ﬁrst panel: 0.273*[0.121]) and to other ﬁrms (third panel: 0.229*[0.122]). It is attenuated for those who  compare to their
top-manager’s wage (second panel: −0.309*[0.135]).
Column 3 is dedicated to the effect of the top 1% wage in one’s ﬁrm. Unsurprisingly, the negative association between
the top 1% wage and wage satisfaction is enhanced for those who know the wage of their top managers.
Finally, column 4 looks at the estimated regional reference wage. Its negative association with wage satisfaction is
enhanced for those who know the wage of their co-workers and compare to it, as well as those who compare to workers in
other ﬁrms.
Overall, these interactions conﬁrm the existence of both relative income concerns and signal effects in the ﬁrm. These
two types of income interactions are reinforced by the awareness of employees about the wage of their colleagues, and the
importance they grant to this information.
5.1.10. Ruling out self-selection into best paying ﬁrms
We  are inclined to interpret these results as reﬂecting the causal effect of wage distribution on wage satisfaction. However,
it could be that workers self-select into ﬁrms in a way that creates the observed statistical associations. To enquire, we use
the information available in the DADS about the tenure and mobility of workers across ﬁrms and across regions. The results
are displayed in Table 8, which shows that the interaction terms between these indicators of mobility and the measures of
reference wage do not attract a statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcient. We  ran a similar exercise where we  distinguished workers
who moved to a better/worse paying ﬁrm; a more unequal/less unequal ﬁrms, and a higher/lower wage region. It turned out
that the interaction terms between these indicators of mobility and the categories of reference wage were not statistically
signiﬁcant.
Hence, the data does not validate the idea that the association between the notions of reference wage and wage satisfaction
is driven by people’s self-selection into certain ﬁrms or regions.
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Table  8
Do workers sort by ﬁrm/region and levels of satisfaction? OLS estimates of wage satisfaction.
Variables Wage satisfaction
1 2 3
1
Quitted during the last ﬁve years −0.011
(0.041)
−0.003
(0.041)
−0.162
(0.341)
Firm median wage 0.178**
(0.061)
0.168**
(0.065)
Quitted during the last ﬁve years × ﬁrm median wage 0.069
(0.147)
2
Quitted during the last ﬁve years −0.011
(0.041)
−0.015
(0.041)
−0.037
(0.205)
Firm P99 −0.046*
(0.027)
−0.047
(0.029)
Quitted during the last ﬁve years × ﬁrm P99 wage 0.007
(0.061)
3
Changed ﬁrm during the last ﬁve years −0.035
(0.032)
−0.033
(0.032)
−0.257
(0.251)
Firm median wage 0.177**
(0.061)
0.301***
(0.082)
Changed ﬁrm during the last ﬁve years × ﬁrm median
wage
0.093
(0.105)
4
Changed ﬁrm during the last ﬁve years −0.035
(0.032)
−0.037
(0.032)
−0.055
(0.171)
Firm P99 −0.046*
(0.027)
−0.013
(0.038)
Changed ﬁrm during the last ﬁve years × ﬁrm P99 wage 0.003
(0.049)
5
Changed region during the last ﬁve years 0.011
(0.039)
0.017
(0.039)
−0.274
(0.254)
Regional reference wage −0.144*
(0.069)
−0.169*
(0.072)
Quitted region the last ﬁve years × regional reference
wage
0.122
(0.103)
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Each cell corresponds to a separate regression of wage satisfaction over the indicated measure. Other controls: all controls of Table A5.
“Changed ﬁrm” is a dichotomous constructed variable based on the objective information contained in the DADS.
“Quitted voluntarily” is a dichotomous self-declared variable, available from SalSa.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.01.
*** p < 0.001.
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l. Conclusions
Based on a matched employer–employee dataset, this study provides evidence of the association between other people’s
age and workers’ satisfaction with their pay. Within ﬁrms, we uncover both signal effects and status effects. On the one
and, for a given level of their own pay, employees are more satisﬁed when they work in a well-paying ﬁrm. For example,
heir satisfaction increases with the median level of wage in their ﬁrm, no matter what their position in the wage distribution
s. On the other hand, they also display relative income concerns. In particular, wage satisfaction decreases with the level of
he top 1% wage in their ﬁrm. The two types of effects are magniﬁed when people are aware of the wage of their coworkers
n their ﬁrm and attach importance to wage comparisons with their colleagues.
Outside the ﬁrm, status effects are predominant, e.g. with regard to the wage of people employed in the same occupation
n other ﬁrms of the region. This contrast may  be due to the extent to which employees feel that they share a common destiny
ith their reference group of coworkers. This suggests that the sense of interdependence among members of a group may
onstitute a speciﬁc component of the signal effect.
These results echo some recent discussions about income gaps. During the last 15 years, France, like many developed
ountries (Atkinson et al., 2011) has been confronted with a sharp rise in the top 1% wage level and, even more so, among the
op 0.1%, especially within the ﬁnancial sector (Landais, 2009; Godechot, 2012). This paper conﬁrms that this global trend is
 source of wage dissatisfaction. However, in terms of magnitude, signal effects outweigh these relative income concerns.
he size of the coefﬁcient on the level of the 1% top wage, for instance, is six times as small as the coefﬁcient on the median
evel of wage in the ﬁrm.
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These ﬁndings also shed some light on the issue of transparency of pay within ﬁrms. Being aware of other people’s pay
may  exert a negative effect on wage satisfaction and other dimensions of wellbeing at work and engagement, via the channel
of relative deprivation. However, signal effects are also powerful, and working with well-paid coworkers exerts a positive
motivation effect. The limit of such signal effects seems to be reached by the extreme high-end of the wage distribution: the
level of the top 1% of the payroll.
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Appendix. Description of the sample
A.1. Description of the surveys
We  used two French datasets. The ﬁrst one comes from a survey that was  run in 2009 among 3000 employees in France,
with a special interest in the way they perceive their wage: SalSa (Les salaires vus par les salariés).2 The second one is
extracted from the DADS-20083. The DADS (Déclarations Annuelles de Données Sociales) is an administrative ﬁle devoted
to the calculation of social contributions. It contains the wages of every wage-earner working in the private sector, in
public hospitals and local administrations. One twelfth of the dataset (i.e. people born in October) is panelized. (National
civil servants pay their social contributions via another system, hence they are not in the database). We matched each
individual surveyed in SalSa with his own records in the DADS as of 2008, as well as with the DADS records of all his
co-workers, i.e. employees working in the same establishment or ﬁrm, which makes a sample of 33,149,444 jobs (we
count jobs rather than individuals, as one individual can occupy several jobs, hence appear several times in the DADS in a
given year). The matching was made possible by fact that the SalSa sample was  randomly selected (by INSEE) out of the
DADS-Panel.
In order to overcome the under-representation of the public sector, the designers of the survey decided to oversample
employees of public hospitals and local administrations. Therefore 20% of the initial sample was selected in these two groups.
Similarly 10% of the sample was selected in the top decile of the private sector’s wage distribution.
To limit the cost of the survey, the sample was  drawn amongst employees living in the following regions: Alsace, Auvergne,
Centre, Languedoc-Roussillon, Lorraine, Midi-Pyrénées, Basse-Normandie, Pays de Loire, Picardie and Rhône-Alpes as well as
in the Essonne department (which is part of Ile-de-France (Paris) Region). The ﬁnal sample is constituted of 3117 interviews.
Table A1 compares the hourly wage rate in the sub-sample of the DADS drawn for the SalSa survey (12.47D,  ﬁrst
row of Table A1), in the entire 2008 DADS sample (12.33D,  second row of Table A1), and in regions where the SalSa
sample was drawn from (11.82D,  third row of Table A1). It must be underlined that in the SalSa survey, the wage is
declared by employees (“what is your monthly net wage, including complements and bonuses”), whereas in the DADS, a
person’s wage is declared by her employer. The former (10.74D) is lower than the latter (12.47D)  for a similar sample
of employees. This discrepancy owes to two reasons. First employees may slightly underestimate their wages, espe-
cially yearly premiums. Second, and more importantly, employees and employers may  use different notions of working
hours: employees are likely to declare the effective number of hours during an ordinary week (including non-paid
extra hours), while employers provide the ofﬁcial number of contractual hours during the year that have been paid
for.
Another caveat is that the SalSa survey has only been run in a subset of French regions, so that it could be imperfectly
representative of the French labor market. In particular, SalSa does not include the region Ile-de France surrounding Paris,
except Essonne, that mostly hosts public administration and higher services sectors, i.e. educated people, working in man-
agerial positions for high wages. However, it turns out that the structure of the labor force is about the same in SalSa as
in the DADS in general. This is due to the aforementioned oversampling of SalSa with civil servants working in the local
2 SalSa was  funded by the Corpus program of the French National Research Agency (ANR). It was run by the French statistical ofﬁce (INSEE). Interviews
were  made, in 2009, by telephone if possible and in face to face otherwise.
3 Access to the data was obtained through the CASD dedicated to researchers authorized by the French Comité du secret statistique.
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Table A1
Wage levels in the (unweighted) regression sample of the SalSa survey.
Mean SD P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 P99 N
Hourly wages
Hourly wage in SalSa
subsample (declared by
employers)
12.47 6.89 7.62 8.65 10.51 13.86 19.49 37.54 2842
Hourly wage in the entire
DADS Panel (declared by
employers)
12.33 88.56 7.10 8.05 9.73 13.13 19.27 43.24 2,146,689
Hourly wage in the entire
DADS Panel restricted to
regions investigated
(declared by employers)
11.82 112.48 7.10 8.02 9.54 12.56 17.71 37.40 826,323
SalSa 2009 Hourly wage
(declared by employees)
10.74 6.60 6.83 7.68 9.28 12.00 15.80 30.72 2842
Monthly wages
SalSa 2009 monthly wage
(declared by employees)
1693 1062 914 1200 1472.8 2000 2700 5500 2842
SalSa 2008 monthly wage
(ﬁrm declared) (calculated
on the basis of yearly
wage/12)
1693.5 1167 634.3 1132.4 1498.1 2007.2 2806 5916.3 2842
Yearly wages
Yearly wage: country
average
16,597 21,586 1413 5934 14,823 21,560 31,079 74,807 2,146,689
Yearly wage: average in
regions of SalSa survey
15,743 17,304 1444 66,003 14,693 20,941 29,249 65,318 826,323
Table A2
Descriptive statistics of the regression sample (SalSa, 2009).
Variable N Mean Standard deviation Min Max
Female 2842 0.49 0.50 0 1
French 2842 0.97 0.18 0 1
Diploma: CE or less 2842 0.12 0.33 0 1
Diploma: CAP, BEP, BEPC 2842 0.37 0.48 0 1
Diploma: BAC (i.e. end of high school diploma) 2842 0.18 0.38 0 1
Diploma: BAC+2 2842 0.17 0.38 0 1
Diploma: BAC+3 and 4 2842 0.07 0.26 0 1
Diploma: BAC+5 and more 2842 0.08 0.27 0 1
Civil servant 2842 0.22 0.41 0 1
Age 2842 42.05 10.42 19 65
Age2 2842 1876.57 873.10 361 4225
Tenure within the ﬁrm 2842 12.25 9.84 0 43
Seniority2 2842 246.80 338.58 0 1849
Log of size of the ﬁrm 2842 4.91 2.39 0 8.52
2009 self declared hourly wage 2842 10.74 6.60 0.54 195.85
2008 DADS hourly wage 2842 12.47 6.88 3.43 115.56
Self-declared hourly wage 2009 (log) 2842 2.29 0.38 −0.62 5.28
Firm-declared hourly wage 2008 (log) 2842 2.43 0.39 1.23 4.75
Firm median hourly wage (log) 2842 2.35 0.25 1.27 4.36
Firm P99 hourly wage (log) 2842 3.40 0.58 1.79 7.20
Regional reference wage 2842 2.36 0.31 2.05 3.36
Wage Satisfaction 2842 2.48 0.72 1 4
Log of wage considered as ‘normal’ 2638 7.48 0.48 4.09 10.13
I like my work 2839 3.47 0.75 1 4
My wage covers my needs 2815 2.46 0.91 1 4
My wage corresponds to my contribution to the ﬁrm 2733 1.45 0.58 1 3
My ﬁrm pays well 2580 2.05 0.68 1 3
My wage corresponds to my experience 2777 1.40 0.53 1 3
My wage corresponds to my diploma 2586 1.75 0.64 1 3
Wants to quit his job 2842 0.16 0.37 0 1
Wants to quit in order to get higher wage 2842 0.08 0.27 0 1
Asked supervisor for a wage rise 2842 0.45 0.50 0 1
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Table A3
The distribution of answers to subjective questions in SalSa (2009).
Concerning your wage, would you say that you are:
Very satisﬁed 4.2%
Rather satisﬁed 49.3%
Rather unsatisﬁed 37.2%
Very unsatisﬁed 9.4%
Do you like what you do during your work?
Yes, almost always 58.6%
Yes, most of the time 31.2%
Yes, sometimes 6.9%
In general, no 3.2%
Refuse to answer or don’t know 0.1%
Is you wage sufﬁcient to cover your needs?
No, your wage is not sufﬁcient 18.7%
You just have enough to pay for your house, your food and your clothes 25.6%
You can live on it and even afford some expenditure for leisure 44.7%
You are comfortable with your income 10.1%
Refuse or don’t know 1.0%
In your opinion, does your wage correspond to what you bring to your employer?
Yes 34.2%
No, it is insufﬁcient with regards to what I contribute to my employer 57.6%
No, my contribution to my employer is lower than my wage (only if spontaneous answer) 4.4%
Refuse or don’t know 3.8%
Would you say that, as compared to other ﬁrms in your industry, wages in your own ﬁrm:
Are good 23.4%
Are is in the average 48.2%
Are rather low 19.1%
Refuse or don’t know 9.2%
Do you consider that your wage:
Is rather high, given your professional experience 2.0%
Is correct, given your professional experience 35.0%
Is rather low, your professional experience 60.7%
Refuse or don’t know 2.3%
Do you consider that your wage:
Is rather high given your level of education 10.0%
Is correct given your level of education 47.9%
Is rather low given your level of education 33.1%
Refuse or don’t know 9.0%
During the last 5 years, did you take a personal action with one of your managers in order to ask for a pay rise, a promotion, or to ask him to help you to
obtain one?
Yes 44.7%
No 53.9%
Refuse or don’t know 1.4%
Today, do you plan to quit your job voluntarily?
Yes 16.4%
No 81.5%
Refuse or don’t know 2.2%
If so, why? (n=466)#
Essentially to obtain a higher pay 49.4%
It is not for the wage 46.1%
Refuse or don’t know 4.5%
Do people to which you compare your wage generally earn: (n=2044)##
More than you 37.9%
As much as you 29.5%
Less than you 18.8%
Refuse or don’t know 13.8%
Note: n=2842, except for # and ##.administration and public hospitals (17% as opposed to 10.6% in the DADS); which also explains the higher proportion of
intermediate occupations in SalSa.
White collar managers Intermediate occupations Employees Blue collar workers
SalSa (n=2842) 12.3% 25.6% 33.8% 28.2%
Panel DADS 2008 (n=2,101,101) 13.7% 22.3% 33.0% 31.0%
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Table A4
Subjective questions (continued) in SalSa.
Yes No Refuse or don’t know or
without object
Amongst the following groups of persons in your professional surrounding, are there any about whom you know, approximately, how much
they earn (including premium and bonuses)?
- Some colleagues exerting the same function as you do inside your ﬁrm? (with a margin of 5%) 66.1% 28.2% 5.8%
- Some of your own direct managers (with a margin of error of 15%) 29.6% 70.0% 0.4%
- The top managers of your ﬁrm (with a margin of 30%) 19.3% 80.3% 0.4%
- Persons doing the same job in other ﬁrms 41.4% 56.3% 2.3%
When you think about your wage, do you also compare it to what other people earn, for example:
- Current colleagues exerting the same occupation as yourself? 49.6% 47.4% 3.0%
- Friends of yours? 44.3% 54.8% 0.9%
- Former schoolmates? 20.8% 66.9% 12.3%
- Family members? 47.8% 51.4% 0.8%
- At least one of these (Comp1) 71.9% 28.1%
Have you recently (over the last 6 months) compared your wage to the minimum wage (SMIC)? 40.9% 56.1% 3.0%
Constructed variable: Compares to colleagues and knows the wage of some of his colleagues 41% 59%
Note: n=2842.
Table A5
Basic OLS estimate of wage satisfaction.
Variables B Robust standard errors Standardized ˇ
Female −0.028 0.028 −0.020
French −0.001 0.077 −0.0002
Diploma: CAP, BEP, BEPC 0.016 0.047 0.011
Diploma: BAC 0.027 0.052 0.015
Diploma: BAC+2 0.006 0.054 0.003
Diploma: BAC+3/4 −0.054 0.067 −0.019
Diploma: BAC+5 & above −0.147* 0.067 −0.056
Hospital or local civil servant −0.042 0.034 −0.024
Age −0.034** 0.010 −0.495
Age2 0.00034** 0.00013 0.408
Tenure −0.015** 0.005 0.183
Tenure2 0.00039** 0.00014 −0.130
Log of ﬁrm size −0.039*** 0.006 −0.129
Log of 2008 hourly wage (declared by ﬁrm) 0.666*** 0.047 0.358
Intercept 1.977*** 0.232 .
Adj. R2 10.83
Number observations 2842
AIC −2169
* p<0.1.
R
A
A
A
B
B
B
B
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
D
F
F** p<0.01.
*** p<0.001.
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